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APPELLATE REVIEW OF ERRORS CONFESSED

BY

ATTORNEY

GENERAL.-

[Federal]
Defendants were convicted of arson for setting fire to a
fraternity house of which both were
members. Reliable evidence as to
defendants' innocence was not admitted by the trial court. After
judgment, the attorney general conducted an independent investigation
which convinced him that the defendants were innocent.
Thereupon, he filed a confession of error
in respect to the appellants' assignments. Held, on appeal, reversed.
But, notwithstanding the attorney
general's confession of error, the
court was bound to review the errors assigned: Parlton v. United
States (1935) 75 F. (2d) 772.
There seems to be no doubt that
it is entirely proper for the attorney
general to confess error when he
deems it apparent: State v. Bailey
(1891) 85 Iowa 713, 50 N. W. 561;
State v. Goddard (1898) 146 Mo.
177, 48 S. W. 62. Nevertheless, no
uniformity of decisions can be
found as to whether or not the court
will reverse without looking into the
record. The early common law view
appears to have been that a confession of error on the part of the attorney general would not divest the
appellate court from its duty of
looking into the record to determine
for itself whether or not there is

Case Editor

error: Rex v. Wilkcs (1770) 4 Burrows 2527, 2551. At the present day
many courts express the opinion
that the record should be examined,
thus throwing the discretion on the
court which will not approve unless
it is of the opinion that due administration of justice requires that the
prosecution be ended: State v.
Mortensen (1922) 224 Ill.
App. 221;
Henderson v. State (1921) 18 Okl.
Cr. 611, 197 Pac. 7-20; Green v.
State (1921)
18 Okla. Cr. 715,
197 Pac. 1077; Bindrun v. State
(1924) 27 Okla. Cr. 372, 228 Pac.
168; State v. Stevens (1910)
153 N. C. 604, 69 S. E. 11. Further,
the California court has recognized
that the power to set aside or modify a judgment in a criminal case,
except for legal grounds appearing
on a record duly presented is not
judicial. It states that it is a branch
of the governor's pardoning power
and cannot be exercised by the attorney general either directly or
through the medium of the court:
People v. Mooney (1917) 175 Cal.
666, 166 Pac. 999; People v.
Mooney (1917)
176 Cal. 105,
167 Pac. 696. Other courts will
reverse without perusing the record
upon mere filing a confession. No
grounds for so doing are stated:
Purgon v. State (1876) 52 Ind. 390;
People v. Lewis (1899) 127 Cal.
207, 59 Pac. 830; Zancannetti v.
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People (1917) 63 Colo. 252, 165
Pac. 612; Richardson v. People
(1918) 69 Colo. 155, 170 Pac. 189.
The view taken in the instant
case would seem to be the better
one. It is claimed that the attorney
general is open to danger of corruption, intimidation and coercion.
Further, a filing of confession is, in
effect, a pardoning power which
may be misused, particularly if the
reviewing court does not examine
the record: Swancara, "Confessions
of Error in Criminal Cases" (1923)
96 Central L. J. 204. See Baker
and DeLong, "The Prosecuting Attorney" (1923) 24 J. Crim. L. 1065,
where the advisability of limiting
the wide discretion now possessed
by prosecuting attorneys is discussed. Certainly a reversal of
conviction for a crime without an
examination of the record gives to
the prosecuting attorney a wide
range of discretion, leaving room
for fraud, collusion and "fixing."
In DeLong, "The State Attorney
General" (1934) 25 J. Crim. L. 374
the almost unlimited discretion of
the attorney general before and during a criminal trial is explained.
Even if wide discretion before trial
is necessary, it would seem best,
once the defendant is convicted by
judicial pronouncement, to take the
case out- of the prosecuting attorney's hands and to allow only the
governor's pardon based upon equitable considerations or the legal
mechanism of the court of appeal to
operate in reversal of judgment.
EUGENE BuscH.
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that he recognized the accused from
a police photograph. The grounds
for the appeal were that the admission of the testimony of the constable was prejudicial in that the
jury might infer a police record.
Held, on appeal, reversed: although
the evidence was not affirmatively
shown to be prejudicial the defendant is entitled to a new trial: Rex
v. McLaren (Alberta 1935) 63 Can.

Cr. Cas. 257.
Generally, the state cannot prove
any crime not alleged in the indictment merely for the purpose of raising a presumption that the defendant would be more apt to commit
the crime in question' 1 Wigmore,
"Evidence" (2d ed. 1923) §§193,
194; People v. Shea (1895) 147 N.
Y. 78, 41 N. E. 505. The exceptions
to this general rule are when evidence of other crimes tends directly

to establish (1) the motive (People
v. Scheck (1934) 356 Ill. 56, 190
N. E. 108), (2) the intent (People
v. Cione (1920) 293 Ii). 321, 127 N.
E. 646), (3) absence of mistake or
accident (State v. Jones (1903) 171
Mo. 401, 71 S. W.'680), (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the
commission of two or more ,crimes
so related to each other that proof
of one tends to establis4 the others
(State v. Thuna (1910) 50-Wash.
689, 109 Pac. 331), (5) sex crimes
(State v. S'vieeney (930)
180
Minn. 450, 231 N. W. 225), (6)
identity of the personi charge d with
the commission of the crime. 1
Wigmore, op. cit. supra §§,00-306.
See generally the excellent discus-

sion in People v. Mojineux '(90i)
168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286.
ADMISSIBILITY OF
It is with exception (6) that this
OTHER CRIMES TO PROVE IDENTITY.
case is involved. Few cases apply
[Canada] The defendant was con- the rule in this situation because
victed upon a charge of receiving there cannot be nany"instances
stolen goods. At the trial a police where separate crimes, with no
constable was permitted to testify unity or connection of motive, in-
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tent or plan will serve to legally
identify the defendant. In Cross v.
People (1868) 47 Ill. 152, 95 Am.
Dec. 474, the witness, who had
talked with the accused after the
forgery, was permitted to relate
what was said as to how other
forgeries were committed, thus helping to identify the defendant. To
prove identity of one as a member
of a gang it was necessary to show
that defendant was present with the
gang on other occasions of similar
character: Jenkins v. Commonwealth (1915) 167 Ky. 544, 180 S.
W. 961. In a trial for robbery where
the identity of the accused was in
question, evidence of witnesses who
had recognized defendant in other
robberies was admissible, when limited ,to that very point: State v.
Caton (1931) 134 Kan. 136, 4 P.
(2d)
677; Whiteman v. State
(1928) 119 Ohio 285, 164 N. E. 5.
Again, if properly limited, evidence
that defendant had sold liquor at
times other than charged is admissible to show identity: Thomas v.
State (1926) 130 Tex. Cr. 671, 282
S. W. 237. In a prosecution for
rape, aticles stolen by defendant and
lost at the scene of the crime were
admissible to prove identity even
though they proved a prior robbery:
State v. Hicks (1934) 180 La. 281,
156 So. 353. See annotations in
(1919) 3 A. L. R. 1540; (1923) 22
A. L. R. 1016; (1923) 27 A. L. R.
357; (1929) 63 A. L. R. 602.
The question narrows itself to the
point directly presented in the instant case. It is well settled that
photographs are proper evidence
when they accurately portray that
which they represent: 2 Wigmore,
op. cit. supra §792; see Note (1923)
23 J. Crim. L. 853. The trouble
arises when a photograph is sought
to be introduced that on its face
shows or implies a previous criminal
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record. The question was presented
in People v. Goltra (1931) 115 Cal.
App. 539, 2 P. (2d) 35, but was not
directly passed upon for the photograph was held inadmissible because
no witness testified it was a likeness
of the accused. The fact that it
came from a: rogue's gallery was
known.
The court in Commonwealth v. Luccitti (1928) 295 Pa.
190, 145 Atl. 85, admitted a photograph from a rogue's gallery where
no markings showed whence it
came. It was stated that ordinarily
such evidence should be kept from
the jury, although it would not
necessarily mean that defendant
was wanted! for a crime. The
proposition was directly passed upon
in two cases and in both it was held
that photographs known to be from
a rogue's gallery were admissible to
prove identity: State v. Leopold
(1929) 110 Conn. 55, 147 Atl. 118;
State v. King (1918) 102 Kan. 155,
169 Pac. 557. One court has even
gone so far as to allow a warden
of another state prison to identify
the accused from a photograph
taken while he was in prison: State
v. Jones (1914) 48 Mont. 505, 139
Pac. 441. Cf. Rocchia v. U. S. (C.
C. A. 9th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 966
where a fingerprint card which was
presented to jury for inspection bore
a reference to previous misconduct
of defendant. Defendant was there
held to have waived any objection
he might have had.
The above cases show that the
courts have admitted evidence of
other crimes when it was reasonably
necessary to establish one or more
of thq exceptions described. In the
instant case, if the testimony of the
constable was probative and necessary to prove the identity of the accused, the fact alone that it was
possibly prejudicial should not have
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justified a reversal of the conviction.
CHARLEs B. RonisoN.

EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION OR

Ex-

"CUSE A=R PROOF OF HOMICIDE.--

[California]

Defendant was con-

victed on a charge of first-degree
murder. The court instructed the
jury in the words of Cal. Pen. Code

(1935) §1105 that, if they believed
that the killing had been proved,
the defendant must make out his
case in mitigation, justification, or
excuse by some proof strong enough
to create in the minds of the jurors
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
Objection was made that the instruction was erroneous, in that it
shifted the burden of proof to defendant. Held, on appeal, affirmed.
The statute did not impose the ultimate burden of proof on defendant,
but merely the burden of going forward with the evidence: People v.
Madison (Cal. 1935) 46 P. (2d)
159.

Apparent contradictions in both
civil and criminal cases have arisen
from a loose use of the phrase,
"burden of proof." The ultimate
burden in criminal cases is on the
prosecution at all times to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt. But
in a secondary sense the burden
does shift to the accused to produce
some evidence in excuse or mitigation, once the killing has been
proved by the prosecution: 4 Wigmore, "Evidence" (2 ed. 1923)
§2485.
California Penal Code (1935)
§1105 declares: "The homicide -by

the defendant being proved, the
burden of proving circumstances of
mitigation, or that justify or excuse it, devolves upon the accused."
This is a correct statement of the
law as found in decisions of other

states: Wheeler v. State (1934) 179
Ga. 287, 175 S. E. 540; State v.
Ward (1931) 51 Idaho 68, 11 P.
(2d) 620; State v. Mangino (1931)
108 N. J. L. 475, 156 AtI. 430, Note
(1932) 22 J. Crim. L. 907; Commonwealth v. Marshall (1927) 287
Pa. 512, 135 Atl. 301; Olive, v.
Commonwealth (1928) 151 Va. 533,
145 S. E. 307. See Note (1931) 21
J. Crim. L. 609. It is also in accord with similar statutes in other
jurisdictions: Rosser v. State (Ariz.
1935) 42 P. (2d) 613; Wilson v.
State (1916) 126 Ark. 354, 190 S.
W. 441; Lumpkin v. State (1911)
5 Okla. Cr. 485, 115 Pac. 478.
The California court has uniformly held it is not error to give
an instruction in the words of
§1105: People v. McClure (1906)
148 Cal. 418, 83 Pac. 437; People v.
Bannon (1922) 59 Cal. App. 50, 209
Pac. 1029; People v. McCurdy
(1934) 140 Cal. App. 499, 35 P.
(2d) 569. In the instant case, the
instruction is even more favorable
to defendant than is §1105 given
alone. For the trial judge explained to the jury the legal mean)ingf of the statute, viz,, that the
only burden on accused is to raise
a reasonable doubt in the minds of
the jurors as to his guilt. Clearly
the court could not call qtfch a favorable and unambiguous instedction reversible error: People v.
Casey (1907) 231 111, 261, 83 N. E.
278.
The Illinois statute, Ill, Rev. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd 1935) e, 38, §373, is
almost identical to California Penal
Code §1105, and over a long period
of years the Illinois court has followed the general rule ar shown
above. There are numerous decisions to the effect that, once the
killing by the defendant is proved,
the burden of proof shifts to him
to produce evidence in justification
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or excuse: Murphy v. People Meyer (1928) 331 Ill.
608, 163 N.
(1865) 37 Ill. 447; Kota v. People E. 453; People v. Russell (1926)
(1891) 136 Ill. 655, 27 N. E. 53; 322 II1. 295, 153 N. E. 389. These
Wacaser v. People (1890) 134 Ill.cases clearly show that the Illinois
438, 25 N. E. 564 (instruction er- court recognizes the principle that
roneous in requiring proof by de- the burden of proof in its secondary
fendant to satisfaction of jury); meaning does shift to the accused
People v. Duncan (1890) 134 Ill. to produce evidence in mitigation
110, 24 N. E. 765 (instruction in or justification, once the killing by
exact language of §373); Wallace the defendant has been proved.
v. People (1896) 159 Ill. 446, 42
The decision in the instant case
N. E. 771; Henry v. People (1902)
seems to be in accord' with the
198 Ill. 162, 65 N. E. 120 (accused weight of authority. Since the
must merely raise reasonable doubt statute contains a correct statement
when all evidence considered). But of the law, an instruction in the
in People v. Durand (1923) 307 Ill. words thereof should not be con611, 139 N. E. 78, the court said sidered prejudicial. However, it
an instruction in the language of would seem abvisable for the trial
§373 should not be given. Then judge to explain the technical lancame a similar holding in People v. guage of the legislature to the jury
Sterankovich (1924) 313 Ill. 556, by additional instructions making it
145 N. E. 172. As a result, al- clear that, as to mitigation, the acthough §373 is still included in the cused merely has the burden of goIllinois Revised Statutes (Smith- ing forward with the evidence and
Hurd 1929, 1935), the annotations that there, as elsewhere, the state
infer it should never be given in a must prove its case beyond a reacharge to the jury, and this seems sonable doubt.
to be the generally accepted view.
HENRY D. LINDAUER.
Itistrue that in the Durand case,
supra, court said §373 should not
be given to the jury, but it qualiRECEIVING STOLEN GooDS-INFERfied its statement ; as follows: ENCE OF GuILTY KNOWLEDGE FROM
"Some instructions given for the RECENT PossEssioN.-[Federal] Depeople on self-defense are errone- fendant was convicted of knowingly
ous. Had all the other instructions

bearing on self-defense been accurate, then the giving of this instruction (§373) would not necessarily be reversible error."
Therefore it is believed that the
giving of §373 verbatim to the jury
is not per se erroneous, in spite of
the fact that such is the prevalent
opinion, based on the annotations.
Itisconceivable that §373 might be
prejudicial ifgiven by itself, but
not ifitis properly supplemented
by other correct instructions. This
isindicated by the language of the
court in two later cases: People v.

receiving, concealing and retaining
in his possession with intent to convert to his own use, two army pistols, stamped with the words
"United States Property." They had
been stolen from a National Guard
Armory 293 days before being
found on defendant's person when
he was arrested for participating in
a shooting affray in company with
gangsters. Defendant denied having possession. Held: on appeal,
reversed.
Defendant's possession,
in absence of supporting evidence,
was not sufficiently recent to sustain
a finding of guilty knowledge:
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Gargotta v. United States (C. C.
A. 8th, 1935) 77 F. (2d) 977.
It has often been stated as a general rule that possession, to justify
an inference of guilty knowledge,
must be "recent possession:" See
generally, Wertheimer v. State
(1929) 201 Ind. 572, 169 N. E. 40,
68 A. L. R. 178, Annotation at 187.
The cases persistently use the term,
often quite casually; but what constitutes "recent" possession depends
largely upon the circumstances in
any particular case, and no attempt
is made to define it: See annotation
to the case of State v. Drew (1904)
179 Mo. 315, 78 S. W. 594, 101 A.
S. R. 474, at 510.
Mr. Wharton says that the significance of "recent possession" is
affected by the identifying earmarks on the stolen article in question: 2 Wharton, "Crim. Ev."
(10th ed. 1912), §760. Early English cases placed importance on the
"readiness with which goods might
pass from hand to hand." In Rex
v. Adams (1829) 172 Eng. Rep.
563, a man was found in possession
of some tools three months after
the theft; it was observed by the
court that these might pass readily
from hand to hand, and the defendant was acquitted without being
called upon for explanation. But
in Rex v. Partridge(1836) 173 Eng.
Rep. 243, a man was found in possession of two ends of woolen cloth
in an unfinished state, two months
after they had been stolen; the court
thought that these particular goods
were not such as might pass readily
from hand to hand, and it was held
a question to go to the jury, which
subsequently found him guilty. The
same idea is incorporated in Roscoe,
"Crim. Ev." (14th ed; 1921), page
22. The author agrees with the decisions that the possession must be
recent, "but what shall be deemed

recent possession," he elaborates,
"must be detemined by the nature of
the articles stolen, i. e., whether
they are of a nature likely to pass
rapidly from hand to hand; or of
which the accused would be likely
from his situation in life, or vocation, to become possessed innocently."
If we accept Roscoe's viewpoint,
the determination of what constitutes "recent" in any particular case
is not a question of law to be decided by the court having in mind
only the time element. "Recentness" of possession will be affected
by the nature of the article, its
readiness in passing from hand to
hand, defendant's situation in life,
and the circumstances of the possession; and whether a question of
fact is presented for the jury will
depend upon the violence of the inference to be drawn from a combination of these evidentiary elements: State v. fennett (1883) 88
N. C. 665. These elements are
weighed by the courts today in raising an inference of guilt, but collaterally with the time element. Few
cases consider them as part of the
"recentness" problem itself. See
State v. Jenkins (Mo. 1919) 213 S.
W. 796, at 799.
The Circuit Court of Appeals in
the principal case excuses defendant's failure to explain possession
by the fact that he consistently denied possession, holding that therefore no explanation was necessary:
Opinion, page 983. Nevertheless, the
court recognizes as one of the
proven facts that the pistols were
actually found in defendant's possession: Opinion, page 981. If we
are to believe the testimony of the
two police officers who took the
pistols from defendant, then defendant's testimony is pirjured.
But the effect of the court's ruling
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that the evidence was insufficient
to go to the jury, is to condone the
perjury and hold that it is not a
guilty circumstance which expands
the inference rising out of the possession. It has been held that denial of possession of stolen goods,
if shown to be false, is a circumstance of guilt against the defendant as a matter of substantive proof
and not merely as affecting credibility: People v. Levison (1860)
16 Cal. 99; Huggins v. People

(1890) 135 Ill. 243, 25 N. E. 1002.
The opinion in the principal case,
however, not only fails to appraise
defendant's denial, in the light of
the police officers' testimony, but
allows the perjury to operate as a
device to relieve defendant of explaining some very untoward circumstances.
Regardless of surrounding circumstances it is hard to call possession 293 days after the theft
"recent" possession. But defendant's possession of pistols plainly
marked "United States Property,"
discovered when he was using the
pistols for an unlawful purpose and
in company with gangsters, which
possession is further characterized
by the fact that defendant not only
refused to offer any explanation but
perjured himself by falsely disclaiming that he had possession, would
seem to be sufficient to take the case
to the jury.
LAWRENCE B. MuiD0cic.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

-

D,-

MURRER TO INFORMATION.[Minn.]

The defendant was arraigned on
November 26, 1934, on an information, filed the same day, charging
that he had, on October 13, 1925,
been guilty of acts constituting him
an accessory after the fact to a
felony. The defendant demurred to

the information on the ground that
it showed on its face that the crime
was committed more than three
years before the date of filing. The
demurrer was overruled and the defendant entered a plea of guilty.
Defendant then moved the court to
reconsider its ruling on the demurrer, and, if still of the opinion
that it should be overruled, to grant
a new trial. From an order denying the motion the defendant appealed. Held: on appeal, reversed,
with order to discharge the defendant from custody. When the information shows that, since the offense charged was committed, the
time within which prosecution may
be had has elapsed, and there is no
allegation of facts which would
avoid the operation of the statute,
that information is demurrable:
State v. Tupa (Minn. 1935) 260 N.
W. 875.
The rule in the majority of jurisdictions is that the objection of the
statute of limitations is not ground
for demurrer. However, 2 Minn.
Stat. (Mason 1927) §10690 provides
that a defendant may demur to an
indictment when there appears on
its face any "legal bar to the prosecution." An identical statutory provision in anothe1 jurisdiction has
been interpreted to allow the statute
to be raised on- demurrer: People
v. Ayherns (1890) 85 Cal. 86, 24 P.
635.
While there is some authority to
the effect that it is not necessary
for an indictment to anticipate a
defense of the statute of limitations
by allegation of matter avoiding it:
People v. Bailey (1918) 103 Misc.
366, 171 N. Y. S. 394; State v. Unsworth (1913) 85 N. J. Law 237, 88
Atl. 1097; U. S. v. Cook (1872) 84
U. S. 168, the more general rule is
that the statute must be avoided by
appropriate allegation: "Lamkin v.
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People (1880) 94 Ill. 501; Garrison fense, so it is difficult to see how he
v. People (1877), 87 Ill. 96; Rouse would be materially prejudiced by
v. State (1902) 44 Fla. 148, 37 S. requiring the statute to be raised
784; Heckrnar v. State (1903) 44 first at the trial. The requisites of
Tex. Cr. 533, 72 S. W. 587. Rea- a fair trial do not demand that he
sons for this divergence from the be informed in advance that the
rule in civil cases that the statute state is prepared to meet his objecis matter of defense and need not be tion based on the statute when he
anticipated by appropriate allega- raises it.
Ordinarily, if the facts were such
tion, which rule is carried over into
the criminal law by those courts as would avoid the statute, the
adhering to the minority rule, are prosecution could, by virtue of the
seldom advanced. Perhaps it is an liberal amendment statute, 2 Minn.
attribute of the policy which dic- Stat. (Mason 1927) §10648, have
tates that all intendments be in amended the information by iisertfavor of the accused. Regardless ing appropriate allegations after the
of which rule is followed, the mat- sustaining of the demurrer and beter avoiding the statute would seem fore the trial had commenced. In
to become part of the state's case, the instant case, since the demurrer
to be proved "beyond a reasonable was overruled by the lower court,
doubt and to a moral certainty." there was no occasion for the proseHowever, the modern trend is to- cution to amend at that time; the
ward the relaxation of the formal action of the appellate court in disrequirements of indictments; in- missing precluded any opportunity
deed, indictments going little further of doing so. It is submitted that in
than to specify the section of the requiring the anticipatory allegacriminal code claimed to have been tion the court demonstrated an unviolated have been sustained: Peo- necessary adherence to the technical
ple v. Bogdanoff (1930) 254 N. Y. requirements of criminal pleading,
16, 171 N. E. 890. The accused cer- and reached an undesirable result in
tainly would know whether the this case.
FANCIs D. RoTH.
statute would offer him a valid de-

